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Introduction
Jason Shade was a student at the Apple Valley Alternative Learning Center, an
alternative high school in Minnesota.1 On the way to an off-campus shop class, Shade’s teacher
stopped at a local fast-food restaurant so the students could buy breakfast.2 Shade bought a
container of orange juice and had trouble opening it, so he asked whether anyone around him had
something he could use to open it.3 A nearby student offered Shade his folding knife, which
Shade used to open his orange juice before passing it back. 4 Shade’s teacher, who was driving
the bus, saw Shade with the knife in his hand, but did not see the surrounding events.5 Three
police officers, two of whom served as school resource officers (SROs), were contacted and
came to search the bus and the students. 6 The knife’s owner admitted to the police that he had a
knife and turned it over.7 For his brief use of the knife on the bus, Shade was charged with and
pled guilty to felony possession of a dangerous weapon on school property. 8
This story is an all too common one in American society. The school-to-prison pipeline is
a pervasive issue that has infected many American school districts. The pipeline has many
causes, but one of the most critical elements towards the pipeline flourishing is the presence of
School Resource Officers (SROs)9 in American schools.10 As seen in Jason Shade’s story, SROs
are routinely called upon to handle minor infractions which results in children being treated like
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See Shade v. City of Farmington, 309 F.3d 1054, 1056 (2002)
See Id. at 1057.
3 See Id.
4 See Id.
5 See Id.
6 See Id.
7 See Id.
8 See Id. at 1058; See Also Developments in the Law – Policing Students, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1747, 1747 (2015)
9 This paper uses the term “school resource officer” and its acronym because it is the most commonly used term to
refer to Police Officers assigned to schools. This paper uses this term even when cited authorities use alternative
terms. Alternate terms include: “school liaison officer”, and “school board officer.”
10 See Infra, Part I.
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criminals and being unnecessarily thrust into the criminal justice system.11 Thanks to the
Supreme Court’s decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and lower courts’ interpretation of that
holding, SROs have been held to a lower standard of reasonableness in the school context than
Police Officers are held to in other, similar contexts.12
This paper will examine whether holding SROs to the same standard of reasonableness in
schools as Police Officers are held to in similar contexts will serve to combat the school-toprison pipeline. This paper will be broken down into four parts. The first part will examine the
school-to-prison pipeline’s effects and the role that SROs play in shaping the pipeline. The
second part will examine the impact that New Jersey v. T.L.O.13 and other cases had on the 4th
Amendment standards that school officials, and by extension SROs, must abide by when
conducting a search or seizure. The third part will examine the 4th Amendment standards that
normal Police Officers must abide by when conducting a search or seizure of an individual, when
conducting an administrative search or seizure, and when conducting a search pursuant to their
community caretaking function. The fourth part will examine how the Supreme Court of the
United States might decide the issue of whether SROs should be considered school officials or
law enforcement officials. The fourth part will also examine whether a determination that SROs
should be considered law enforcement officials would serve to combat the school-to-prison
pipeline.
Part I: The School-to-Prison Pipeline
The school-to-prison pipeline (the pipeline) refers to the phenomena of juveniles being
funneled out of public schools and into the criminal justice system.14 The pipeline has many

Developments in the Law – Policing Students, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1747, 1747-1748 (2015)
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
13 See Id.
14 See https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline
11
12

3

causes, the most driving factors being the implementation of “zero-tolerance” disciplinary
policies, the growing presence of police (SROs) in schools, and the criminalization of school
discipline.15 The issues of police presence and the criminalization of school discipline go hand in
hand as the presence of police leads to the criminalization of discipline.
The pipeline’s origins stem from the overly punitive sentencing and policing policy in the
1970s and 1980s, such as federal and state mandatory minimum sentencing laws and “Three
Strikes” laws.16 These policies led to a dramatic rise in the prison population and has left the
United States as the world leader in incarceration both in numbers and in per capita rates.17 The
policies also served to disproportionately target people of color in urban areas. 18 The punitive
shift that swept the nation was reflected in the approaches schools began to take as well.19 Many
scholars point to the adaptation of zero tolerance policies and the use of rhetoric originating from
the Reagan-era War on Drugs in schools as the origin of the school-to-prison pipeline.20
The “zero-tolerance” school disciplinary policies rapidly gained popularity in the 1990s
due to a perceived increase in crime in schools.21 “Zero-tolerance” policies impose severe
punishment on students for disciplinary infractions regardless of the circumstances of the
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See Judah Schept, Tyler Wall, and Avi Brisman, Building, Staffing, and Insulating: An Architecture of
Criminological Complicity in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 41 Soc. Just. 96, 97 (2014); See Generally William
Ayers, Rick Ayers, and Bernadine Dohrn, Zero Tolerance: Resisting the Drive for Punishment in Our Schools: a
Handbook for Parents, Students, Educators, and Citizens (1 st . Ed. 2001)
16 See Id. at 98.
17 See Id.
18 See Id.
19 See Id.; See Also Judith A. Brown, Derailed: The School To Jailhouse Track, Advancement Project at 6. (2003)
20 See Judah Schept, Tyler Wall, and Avi Brisman, Building, Staffing, and Insulating: An Architecture of
Criminological Complicity in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 41 Soc. Just. 96, 98 (2014); See Also Judith A. Brown,
Derailed: The School To Jailhouse Track, Advancement Project at 6. (2003); See Also Peter Price, When Is a Police
Officer an Officer of the Law?: The Status of Police Officers in Schools, 99 Nw. Sch. L. J. Crim. L. & Criminology
541, 541-42 (2009); See Also William Ayers, Rick Ayers, and Bernadine Dohrn, Zero Tolerance: Resisting the
Drive for Punishment in Our Schools: a Handbook for Parents, Students, Educators, and Citizens (1 st . Ed. 2001)
21 See Judah Schept, Tyler Wall, and Avi Brisman, Building, Staffing, and Insulating: An Architecture of
Criminological Complicity in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 41 Soc. Just. 96, 98 (2014); See Also Josh Gupta Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2013,
2040 (2019)
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violation.22 These policies, and the pipeline in general, disproportionately affect students of
color.23 The rates of school suspension dramatically increased shortly after the embrace of “zerotolerance” policies, rising from 1.7 million suspensions in 1974 to 3.1 million in 2000. 24 The
increase in suspension rates has been most dramatic for children of color who are far more likely
to be suspended, expelled, or arrested than their white peers for the same conduct at school.25 In
the 2017-2018 school year, African-American students represented 31.4 percent of students who
received one or more in-school suspensions, 38.8 percent of students who received one or more
out-of-school suspensions, and 38.8 percent of students who were expelled with educational
services despite representing only 15.1 percent of the total student enrollment. 26 These overly
harsh disciplinary outcomes serve to push students into the pipeline. 27 Children who are
suspended or expelled often find themselves unsupervised and without any constructive activities
which can lead to them getting involved in problematic activities they otherwise would not get
involved in.28 These children also more easily fall behind in their schoolwork, leading to a
greater likelihood of disengagement and, eventually, drop-outs.29 All of these consequences of
“zero-tolerance” policies increase the likelihood of children being involved in the criminal
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See Id.; See Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline
See Id. at 99; See Also Advancement Project, Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track (Mar.
2005) at 15.; See Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline
24 See Advancement Project, Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track at 15 (Mar. 2005); See
Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline
25 See Russel J. Skiba, Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence at 11-12 (2000); See Also The Advancement Project & The
Civil Rights Project, Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School
Discipline Policies at 7-9 (June 2000); See Generally Russel J. Skiba, Robert S. Michael, Abra Carroll Nardo, and
Reece L. Peterson, The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment
(2000); See Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline
26 See U.S. Education Department, Office for Civil Rights, 2017-18 Civil Rights Data Collection, (May 2021)
27 See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on School Health, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion,
112 Pediatrics 1207 (Nov. 2003); See Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline
28 See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on School Health, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion,
112 Pediatrics 1207 (Nov. 2003).; See Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline
29 See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on School Health, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion,
112 Pediatrics 1207 (Nov. 2003); See Also Johanna Wald and Dan Losen, Defining and Re-directing a School-toPrison Pipeline, 99 New Directions for Youth Dev. 11 (Fall 2003); See Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenilejustice/school-prison-pipeline
23
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justice system.30 Once the pipeline was constructed by such policies, the prevalence of SROs in
schools served to ensure that children continued to flow through it. 31
School resource officers (SROs) have become regular features in American public
schools since the 1990s and early 2000s.32 The number of SROs in schools has grown
substantially in response to the early-1990s peak crime rate and the rise of mass shootings at
schools.33 As of 2019, there are approximately 20,000 sworn police officers stationed at
schools.34 The presence of SROs in schools is a significant factor which has allowed the schoolto-prison pipeline to flourish.35 The reliance of under-resourced schools on the Police to maintain
discipline in hallways has resulted in children becoming far more likely to be arrested for nonviolent offenses such as disruptive behavior, exposing them to the justice system early and
leading them to become more likely to be exposed to it again later. 36 The presence of SROs in
school correlates with an increased likelihood that incidents in schools will be reported to law
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See Judah Schept, Tyler Wall, and Avi Brisman, Building, Staffing, and Insulating: An Architecture of
Criminological Complicity in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 41 Soc. Just. 96, 99 (2014)(“Once a child drops out, he
or she is eight times more likely to be incarcerated than you th who finish high school.”); See Also American
Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on School Health, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 112 Pediatrics 1207
(Nov. 2003); See Also Johanna Wald and Dan Losen, Defining and Re-directing a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 99
New Directions for Youth Dev. 11 (Fall 2003); See Also https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prisonpipeline
31 See Judah Schept, Tyler Wall, and Avi Brisman, Building, Staffing, and Insulating: An Architecture of
Criminological Complicity in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 41 Soc. Just. 96, 99 (2014)
32 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2015 (2019)
33 See Id.
34 See Id.
35 See Judah Schept, Tyler Wall, and Avi Brisman, Building, Staffing, and Insulating: An Architecture of
Criminological Complicity in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 41 Soc. Just. 96, 97 (2014); See William Ayers, Rick
Ayers, and Bernadine Dohrn, Zero Tolerance: Resisting the Drive for Punishment in Our Schools: a Handbook for
Parents, Students, Educators, and Citizens (1 st . Ed. 2001); See Also Henry Giroux, The Terror of Neoliberalism:
Authoritarianism and the Eclipse of Democracy (2004); See Also Torin Monahan and Rodolfo D. Torres, Schools
Under Surveillance: Cultures of Control in Public Education (2010); See Also Henry Giroux, Disposable Youth:
Racialized Memories, and the Culture of Cruelty (2012); See Also Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches
Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2013, 2015 (2019)
36 See Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s Prison and Jail
Populations?, 38 Crim. & Just. 256 (2009); See Also Jason P. Na nce, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth
Amendment Rights, 94 Ind. L. J. 48, 76 (2019)
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enforcement agencies.37 Nationally, 17 percent of all juvenile charges arise from incidents at
school and that figure is significantly higher in some jurisdictions. 38 Prior to the pervasiveness of
SROs, a student who was in possession of a joint of marijuana on school property would have
been disciplined through the school, via detention, suspension, or like methods. 39 Today, a
student in that situation now also faces being arrested by their school’s SRO and will be
unnecessarily exposed to the criminal justice system. 40
The presence of police has no impact on the safety of the school41 , instead offering
another avenue for children in under-resourced public schools to be exposed to the criminal
justice system.42 These officers are often poorly trained to deal with adolescents, yet they are
responsible for maintaining discipline rather than the administration and appropriately trained
guidance counselors. The armed officers put in school to maintain peace are often perpetrators of
violence against communities of color in the school. 43 Scholars argue that the very existence of
the pipeline negatively affects students who are not directly exposed to it, finding lower
academic achievement among all students who attend overly punitive schools. 44 The detrimental
effects of the presence of SROs in schools stems in large part from how the Supreme Court of
the United States has interpreted the 4th Amendment and how weak the 4th Amendment has
become in the school environment.

See Michael Heise and Jason P. Nance, “Defund the (School) Police”? Bringing Data to Key School -to-Prison
Pipeline Claims, 111 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717 (2021); See Also Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School
Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2013, 2040-2041 (2019)
38 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2041 (2019)
39 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2015 (2019)
40 See Id.
41 See Judah Schept, Tyler Wall, and Avi Brisman, Building, Staffing, and Insulating: An Architecture of
Criminological Complicity in the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 41 Soc. Just. 96, 99 (2014)
42 See Id.
43 See Id.
44 See Brea L. Perry and Edward W. Morris, Suspending Progress: Collateral Consequences of Exclusionary
Punishment in Public Schools, 79 Am. Soc. Rev. 1067 (Nov. 5. 2014)
37
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Part II: The Fourth Amendment in the School
The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects.45 The purpose of the Amendment is to protect the privacy and security of
individuals against government intrusion.46 The Fourth Amendment provides individuals with a
broad right against such governmental intrusion. 47 The amendment protects “people, not places”
therefore its protections extend to many areas. 48 Fourth Amendment protections extend to the
school context, as well as the personal and residential contexts. When compared to the
protections provided in other contexts, the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment in
schools are diminished.
A. History
Despite the Fourth Amendment extending protection to students in the schooling context,
the Fourth Amendment has been frustrated in schools in large part due to The Supreme Court’s
holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O.49 In T.L.O., a teacher discovered two girls smoking in a
bathroom at Piscataway High School.50 The girls were brought to the principal’s office and in
response to questioning from the assistant principal, T.L.O. claimed that she was not smoking in
the bathroom and did not smoke at all.51 The assistant principal demanded to see T.L.O.’s purse
and, while searching the purse, noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers which in his

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized”).
46 See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S., 523, 528 (1967) (stating that the “basic purpose” of
the fourth amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
government officials.”); See Also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-647 (1961)
47 See Steven Wax, The Fourth Amendment, Administrative Searches and the Loss of Liberty , 18 Envr. L. 911, 913
(1988)
48 See Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))
49 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2019 (2019)
50 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985)
51 See Id.
45
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experience was closely associated with marijuana use. 52 The purse was then thoroughly searched
under suspicion of it containing evidence of drug use. 53 The search revealed a small amount of
marijuana, a pipe, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared
to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in
marijuana dealing.54 The police were notified and T.L.O. had delinquency charged brought
against her by the State.55 T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, contending
that the assistant principal’s search of her purse was a violation of her Fourth Amendment
rights.56
The Court first held that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school
authorities.57 To determine the standard of reasonableness which should govern this class of
searches, the Court must balance “the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails.”58 The Court makes it clear that students have some meaningful expectation of privacy at
school which is protected by the Fourth Amendment and weighs that interest against the
“substantial” interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline on school
property.59 Applying this analysis, the Court holds that school officials may conduct a
warrantless search of students at school needing only reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause.60 The Court justifies applying this lowered standard by recognizing the need for flexibility

52

See Id.
See Id.
54 See Id.
55 See Id. at 329.
56 See Id.
57 See Id. at 337. (The Court rejects the State’s argument that school administrators act in loco parentis in their
dealings with students and therefore derive their authority from the parent, not the State. The Court holds that school
officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and that they cannot claim
parental immunity from the Fourth Amendment.)
58 See Id. at 337. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S., 523, 536-537 (1967))
59 See Id. at 339.
60 See Id. at 340-342.
53
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in school disciplinary procedures and “the value of preserving the informality of the student teacher relationship.61 The Court opines that focusing the standard on reasonableness will spare
teachers and school administrators from being forced to learn the nuances of probable cause and
will instead allow them to regulate their conduct based on reason and common sense. 62 To
determine whether a search is reasonable, a two-pronged test must be applied.63 Under this test,
first one must consider whether the search was justified at its inception and second, one must
determine whether the search as conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place. 64 Having determined the appropriate standard,
the Court applied it and held that the assistant principal had reasonable suspicion to believe that
both searches of T.L.O.’s purse would produce evidence of a violation of school policy. 65
It is important to note that T.L.O. was decided before SROs were as common as they are
today.66 As of writing, the Supreme Court has not issued a ruling which definitively states the
Fourth Amendment standard that applies to searches conducted by or involving SROs. 67 While
the Court clearly held in T.L.O that school officials acting alone may generally conduct a
warrantless search based on reasonable suspicion, it expressly avoided ruling on searches
conducted by school officials at the behest of or in conjunction with law enforcement or searches
conducted by law enforcement officers themselves. 68 In the absence of clear guidance from the
Supreme Court on this issue, most state courts to decide the issue have distinguished SROs from
other police officers or have interpreted searches involving SROs as searches initiated or led by

61

See Id. at 340.
See Id. at 343.
63 See Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))
64 See Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))
65 See Id. at 345-346.
66 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2018 (2019)
67 See Id.
68 See Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985))
62
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school officials.69 Therefore, in the majority of states that has decided this issue, SROs are held
to the lowered Fourth Amendment standard for school officials, rather than the standard for
police officers.70
Despite never clarifying what standard should apply to searches involving SROs, the
Supreme Court has revisited school searches carried out by school officials. 71 The most
important cases on this subject are Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton72 , and Board of
Education v. Earls.73 In both cases, students involved in certain voluntary school activities were
required to consent to drug testing as a condition of participating in the school activity. 74 A
positive test result would require students to participate in a drug-use prevention program or
otherwise be suspended from participation in extracurricular activities. 75 A positive test result
carries no law enforcement penalties.76 The Court balances the State’s interest in preventing drug
use by children against the Fourth Amendment privacy interests of the students and finds that the
need to prevent and deter childhood drug use is substantial enough that suspicionless drug testing
programs are reasonable.77 The Earls Court notes in dicta that it has not required a showing of a
particularized or pervasive drug problem before allowing suspicionless drug testing. 78 The Court

69

See Id.; See Generally People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195 (Ill. 1996) (holding that SROs are properly considered
school officials, rather than law enforcement officials); See Also In re P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988) (holding
that a search involving an SRO was initiated and led by school officials)
70 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2018 (2019); See Also In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 699-701 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. D.S.,
685 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1065 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998);
M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563, 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); S.A. v. State, 654 N.E. 2d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); State v. Voss, 267 P.3d 735, 736, 738-739 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) (Various state court holdings which
acknowledge SROs as school officials.)
71 See Id. at 2022; See Also Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); See Also Board of
Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
72 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
73 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
74 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 826 (noting that the policy applied to any extracurricular activity but in practice was only
applied to competitive activities); See Acton, 515 U.S. at 648.
75 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833-834; See Acton, 515 U.S. at 651.
76 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833-834; See Acton, 515 U.S. at 651.
77 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-838; See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-665.
78 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 835. (citing Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673-674 (1989)
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asserts that it would make little sense to require a school district to wait until it can show that a
substantial portion of its students are using drugs before allowing it to institute a drug testing
program designed to deter drug use.79 Importantly, a “rather critical consideration”80 in the
Court’s analysis was that the consequences of the drug test were minor, and particularly that law
enforcement would not obtain the results of the drug tests so no delinquency or criminal charges
would result.81
These cases represent yet another blow against a student’s Fourth Amendment
protections in the school environment, as now the Supreme Court has identified State interests
which are so compelling that searches undertaken to further such interests do not even require
reasonable suspicion. Instead, no suspicion at all is required. 82 Scholars like Eve Brensike Primus
have argued that cases can be read as identifying children as a special subpopulation with
reduced expectations of privacy justifying lower standards for searches.83
These cases are especially alarming when considered in comparison to the case Chandler
v. Miller.84 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a Georgia requirement that candidates for
state office pass a drug test was not a constitutionally permissible suspicionless search. 85 The
Court found that there was no substantial special need proffered which was sufficiently vital to
overcome the Fourth Amendment’s traditional requirement of individualized suspicion. 86 In
explaining its inability to find a substantial special need, the Court notes that Georgia did not
provide any indication of a concrete danger nor did it suggest that the dangers sought to be

79

See Id. at 836.
See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §10.11(c), at 631 n.139 (5 th ed.
2012)
81 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833-834; See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
82 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-838; See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-665.
83 See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 222 Colum. L. Rev. 254, 270-71 (2011)
84 520 U.S. 305 (1997)
85 See Id. at 323.
86 See Id. at 318.
80
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avoided were real and not simply hypothetical. 87 The Court’s willingness in Earl to assert that a
showing of a particularized or pervasive drug problem was not necessary, when contrasted with
its denouncement of Georgia’s state official drug testing for lack of a showing of a particularized
or pervasive drug problem, suggests that the Court distinguishes the schooling context as an
environment where lowered Fourth Amendment standards apply. The Court has shown great
deference to purported state interests in the schooling environment and has declined to scrutinize
said interests as closely as it does where the rights of adults are implicated.
B. Application to SROs
In the absence of a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, the determination of what
Fourth Amendment standards apply to SRO searches of students in school has been left to state
courts.88 The majority of state courts to address the issue have held that the lowered T.L.O.
standard for school officials also applies to SROs. 89 The leading case for establishing this
majority view is People v. Dilworth90 , a 1996 Illinois Supreme Court case.91
In People v. Dilworth, an SRO suspected that a student, Dilworth, was selling drugs on
school grounds.92 The SRO searched Dilworth on his own initiative and authority 93 , found a bag
of cocaine, and arrested Dilworth.94 Dilworth challenged the search under the Fourth

87

See Id. at 318-319.
See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2024 (2019)
89 See Id.; See R.D.S. v. State, 245 S. W.3d 356, 367 (Tenn. 2008); See also Developments in the Law – Policing
Students, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1747, 1748 (2015)
90 169 Ill. 2d 195 (Ill. 1996)
91 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2013, 2024 (2019); See also Barry C. Feld, Cases and Materials on Juvenile Justice Administration 244 (5 th
ed. 2018); Leslie J. Harris et al., Children, Parents, and the Law: Public and Private Authority in the Home,
Schools, and Juvenile Courts 444 (3d ed. 2012) (law school casebooks reporting People v. Dilworth as a leading
case for establishing the majority view on the treatment of SROs.)
92 See People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 198 (Ill. 1996)
93 See Id. at 208
94 See Id. at 198
88
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Amendment, arguing that the SRO needed probable cause because he was a police officer. 95 The
Court balanced the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intruded, the character of
the search, and the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue and the efficacy
of the means for meeting it to determine whether the probable cause standard or reasonable
suspicion standard should apply in this situation. 96 The Court concluded that reasonable
suspicion was the appropriate standard.97 Astonishingly, despite the arrest and prosecution that
immediately followed the search, the Court concluded that the SRO’s search was initiated to
further the school’s maintenance of a proper educational environment, rather than being initiated
for a law enforcement purpose.98 Despite the SRO’s own testimony that his primary purpose at
the school was to prevent criminal activity, the Court found that his overall purpose was to assist
other school officials in their attempt to maintain a proper educational environment, and thus, he
was properly considered to be a school official. 99
Since Dilworth, the view of SROs as school officials has been adopted by multiple other
state courts.100 This view is so pervasive that it has even been codified in a 2017 Indiana
statute.101 After the Indiana Supreme Court suggested that SRO searches were only entitled to
the reasonable suspicion standard when performing school discipline, rather than law
enforcement duties102 , the Indiana legislature enacted a statute which allowed SROs to use the

95

See Id. at 206
See Id. at 209-210
97 See Id. at 210
98 See Id. at 208
99 See Id. at 214
100 See Josh Gupta -Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87
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reasonable suspicion standard for searches and seizures without limit. 103 The fact that the Indiana
legislature felt emboldened to codify the application of the reasonable suspicion standard to all
searches and seizures undertaken by SROs shows just how accepted the view of SROs as school
officials has become.
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court has resulted in some inconsistent results as
some state courts have come to different conclusions when presented with similar facts. Most
notably, state courts have differed on whether searches involving SROs are to be considered
investigations directed by school officials or the police department. 104 The Dilworth Court noted
that where outside police officers initiate a search, or where school officials act at the behest of
law enforcement agencies, the probable cause standard must be applied. 105 State courts are split
on whether the involvement of SROs constitutes a situation where outside police officers initiate
a search or where school officials act at the behest of law enforcement agencies.
This split is perhaps best exemplified by the different results in In re P.E.A.106 and F.P. v.
State107 , two cases decided in 1988 with strikingly similar facts. In In re P.E.A., an outside
officer alerted a junior high school principal that two students may have been in possession of
stolen marijuana.108 The outside officer remained at the school while the principal and the
school’s SRO investigated the claim and ultimately seized P.E.A. physically and searched his
vehicle.109 The Supreme Court of Colorado held that because the officer did not request the
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searches or participate in any way, the principal and SRO did not act as agents of the police. 110
Somehow, the officer supplying information to the principal with the intent of initiating a search
and his presence on school premises during the search did not establish that the principal and
SRO acted as police agents.111
In F.P. v. State, an outside police officer was questioning a student at a middle school
when he came to believe that F.P. was in possession of a stolen vehicle. 112 The officer informed
the school’s SRO and the officers tried to find F.P. but could not. 113 After the outside officer left,
the SRO saw F.P., called the outside officer, and took F.P. into her office where she asked him if
he had anything he needed to give to her.114 F.P. produced car keys and a paper from his pocket
and a few minutes later was arrested by the returning outside officer. 115 Here, the Court of
Appeal of Florida held that the SRO acted at the behest of law enforcement, and therefore she
needed probable cause to effectuate a constitutionally permissible search. 116
The fact that almost identical facts can give rise to completely different results depending
on what state the case is heard in makes it crucial that the United States Supreme Court address
this issue definitively. The presence of SROs in both cases and the murkiness their presence
clouds the analysis with suggests that this issue is ripe for Supreme Court determination. At
present, an SRO faced with a similar factual situation in a state which has not decided this issue
would have no guidance on whether they were an agent of the police or a school official. This
SRO would essentially have to guess whether they needed probable cause or only reasonable
suspicion when conducting a search. This Fourth Amendment guessing game cannot be what the
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Supreme Court had in mind when it decided T.L.O and it is time for the Supreme Court to finally
address the issue of whether SROs are school officials or law enforcement officers.
The application of T.L.O.’s lowered standard for school officials to SROs combined with
the ambiguity over whether their involvement constitutes the involvement of law enforcement
creates an environment that is ripe for overinclusive activity by SROs. SROs are free to conduct
searches in schools with only reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause to believe that a
search will reveal evidence of a crime.117 This results in more children being searched by law
enforcement under circumstances that would not justify a search in another environment simply
because their encounter with the officer occurred at school. These searches directly contribute
towards the funneling of children down the school-to-prison pipeline. Children in school find
themselves being exposed to the criminal justice system for activity which would not otherwise
have justified police intervention. This practice must be addressed in order to combat the schoolto-prison pipeline.
Part III: The Fourth Amendment Generally
The cases described in Part II highlight the 4 th Amendment protections afforded in a
school context. This part will discuss the 4th Amendment’s applications outside of the school
context. This part is meant to contrast the behaviors of School Resource Officers in schools with
those of Police Officers in other contexts.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees individual citizens the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures and requires the issuance of warrants based on probable
cause.118 The requirement of obtaining a warrant based on probable cause is not absolute. The
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Supreme Court of the United States has identified exceptions to the warrant requirement.119
These exceptions apply under specific contexts which have been established by the Supreme
Court.120 Most relevant to the application of the Fourth Amendment in the school context are
warrantless searches undertaken due to suspicion of an individual, warrantless searches
undertaken in the administrative context, and warrantless searches undertaken as a function of
the Police’s community caretaking function.
A. Individual Suspicion
The seminal case Terry v. Ohio is perhaps the best place to begin an exploration of a
Police Officer’s right to conduct a warrantless search so long as they possess a “reasonable
suspicion” that criminal activity is afoot and that the person they are dealing with may be armed
and presently dangerous.121 In Terry, Officer McFadden was patrolling in plain clothes in
downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 P.M. 122 He observed two men on the corner of the
street, Chilton and Terry, who “didn’t look right to [him] at the time.” 123 As he observed the
men, he saw one leave the other and walk down the street, stopping to look in a store window
before continuing to walk a short distance, turning around and walking back to the corner,
stopping to look into the same store window on his way back.124 The second man then went
through the same series of motions.125 The two men repeated this pattern approximately five or

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized”).
119 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (Stating that some warrantless searches are acceptable under
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481-82 (1963); quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
120 See Id.
121 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)
122 See Id. at 5.
123 See Id.
124 See Id. at 6.
125 See Id.
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six times each.126 At one point, a third man approached them and briefly conversed before
walking away.127 After ten to twelve minutes of pacing, the two men walked away following the
same path as the third man who had approached them earlier.

128

Officer McFadden had grown

thoroughly suspicious by this time, suspecting that the men were planning to rob the store whose
window they repeatedly peered into and fearing that the men may have weapons. 129 Following
the men, Officer McFadden observed them stop to talk to the same man that they had talked to
earlier on the street corner.130 At this point, Officer McFadden approached the men, identified
himself as a police officer, and asked the men for their names. 131 When he received a mumbled
response to his inquiries, Officer McFadden grabbed Terry and patted him down to determine
whether he had any weapons.132 Upon feeling a pistol, the officer took action to seize the weapon
and searched the other two men for weapons, discovering a revolver in Chilton’s overcoat. 133
Officer McFadden testified that he only patted the men down to determine whether they had
weapons and that he did not place his hands beneath the outer garments of the men until he had
felt their weapons.134
The Supreme Court held that Officer McFadden’s actions did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because under the circumstances of the case, the search was “reasonable.”135 The
Supreme Court’s holding is written as though it were a narrow one. They assert that each case
must be decided on its own facts and limit their holding to:
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Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him.136
However narrowly the Court tried to frame its holding, this case provided the groundwork upon
which various other warrant exceptions were built. By shifting the standard for searches from
probable cause to reasonable suspicion, the Court created a litany of circumstances under which
warrants are not needed for police officers to conduct a search.
The exception to the warrant requirement articulated in Terry is premised on the theory of
safety. An officer shouldn’t be constrained by the requirements of probable cause or warrants
when they are faced with circumstances which reasonably suggest to them that either their own
safety or the safety of the public is at imminent risk. 137 However reasonable this proposition
appears, in practice it has resulted in the erosion of Fourth Amendment protections as the
exceptions have swallowed the rule.
A series of cases, beginning with United States v. Cortez138 , gradually expanded the
scope of Terry stops and weakened the standard of reasonable suspicion. 139 In Cortez, law
enforcement stopped persons suspected of smuggling illegal aliens.140 The Supreme Court used
this case to clarify that the legitimacy of a Terry stop is not based only on the facts observed by
the officer at the scene, but rather on the totality of the circumstances. 141 The reviewing court is
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to consider police reports and “patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers” 142 in
determining whether there exists evidence that a suspect was engaged in wrongdoing. 143 The
Cortez court also ordered that courts must weigh the appropriateness of Terry stops “as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.” 144 In other words, courts must
determine whether a police officer, rather than a reasonable person, would feel that all of the
circumstances raise a suspicion that the individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. 145
Cortez sent a strong message to lower courts that Terry stops were to be evaluated with great
deference to the police.146
This deference to the police can be observed in several Supreme Court decisions
throughout the 1980s147 , culminating in the Court’s decision in United States v. Sokolow.148 In
Sokolow, the police concluded that reasonable suspicion existed based on the combination of
seemingly innocent activities.149 The suspect purchased airline tickets with cash, checked no
luggage, appeared nervous, stayed in Miami for a short time, and travelled under a name which
did not match the name that his telephone number was listed under. 150 Despite each of these
activities being innocent, together they raised the officer’s suspicion because they matched the
police profile of a drug trafficker.151 The Supreme Court held that the fact that the suspect fit the
profile supplied adequate individualized suspicion to justify a Terry stop.152
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As time has gone on, Terry stops have been approved based on even smaller amounts of
evidence. In Alabama v. White153 , a car was stopped based on an anonymous tip which correctly
described the defendant’s vehicle, time and place of departure, and destination.154 Police
observation corroborated some, but not all, of the descriptions provided by the tip. 155 Despite the
fact that the tip provided no indicia of its reliability, the Supreme Court held that police
corroboration of some of the tip was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. 156
The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to approve stops that were based on no
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, of the individual who was stopped. 157 In Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz, the police set up a sobriety checkpoint where each car that
passed by was stopped.158 The Supreme Court applied a balancing of interests analysis and
concluded that given the magnitude of the drunken driving problem and the slight nature of the
intrusion upon the privacy of those stopped, the stops were reasonable even in the absence of
individualized suspicion.159
This progeny of cases since Terry suggests that reasonable suspicion is not a very high
standard at all.160 The standard has continued to weaken over time, to the point that innocent
activities grouped together, or even no individual activity at all, can be sufficient to meet the
standard.161 The application of this standard, and its waning strength, has contributed to the
erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
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B. Administrative Searches
The history of the Fourth Amendment in the administrative context is fruitful for
illustrating how the Fourth Amendment’s protections have waned over the years. Beginning with
the weakening of the probable cause standard in searches requiring a warrant 162 and culminating
in the Court’s holding in Donovan v. Dewey that warrantless searches are valid when Congress
has reasonably determined that the searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme.
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In

the administrative context, the interests of various administrative agencies are prioritized at the
expense of the liberty interests of businesspeople, employees, and others subjected to the
administrative agents’ intrusions.
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The protection from warrantless searches and seizures has

been significantly weakened, as new governmental powers are rarely confined to the context that
gave rise to them.165
In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court considered whether warrants are
required in administrative searches, and if so, how the probable cause standard is defined in that
context. 166 Camara refused to permit a warrantless inspection of his apartment building
residence, demanding that a warrant be obtained, and was charged with a criminal violation of
the San Francisco housing code.167 He argued that the housing code which authorized municipal
officials to enter a dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a
Housing Code violation exists therein is unconstitutional on its face. 168 The Court agreed with
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Camara that warrantless administrative searches without probable cause are violations of the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. 169 However, the Court disagreed with Camara’s
assertion that warrants should only be issued in the administrative context where the inspector
possesses probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the standards
prescribed by the code being enforced. 170
The Court asserts that to apply the probable cause standard, it is necessary to focus upon
the governmental interest which allegedly justifies intrusion on a citizens constitutionally
protected interests.171 The Court distinguishes administrative searches from searches pursuant to
a criminal investigation, noting that rather than searching for specific contraband or goods like in
a criminal search, an administrative search is aimed at securing “city-wide compliance with
minimum physical standards for private property.”172 To determine whether a particular search is
reasonable, and thus determining that there is probable cause for that inspection, the need for
inspection must be weighed against the goals of code enforcement. 173 Applying this analysis, the
Court concludes that an administrative search is “reasonable” and probable cause must exist
where “reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.” 174
This probable cause standard is a marked departure from the traditional probable cause
standard which permits a search only when “ ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is
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being committed.” 175 The Court recognized that this applying this standard in the administrative
context would inhibit enforcement efforts and justified its modified probable cause standard to
reconcile this tension.176 The weakening of the probable cause standard served as a preview of
the impending weakening of Fourth Amendment protections in the administrative arena.177
Three years after Camara was decided, the Court carved out an exception to the general
Camara rule. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, liquor was seized without a warrant
by Internal Revenue Service agents after a warrantless search of a locked storeroom in
Colonnade’s catering business.178 The Court looked to the long history of governmental
regulation in the liquor industry and approved of the warrantless inspection and seizure. 179
The Court established another exception to the warrant requirement in United States v.
Biswell.180 In that case, a warrantless administrative search of a pawn shop was conducted by a
federal treasury agent.181 The Court held the challenged statute constitutional, finding that the
inspection scheme was of central importance to federal and state law enforcement efforts and
finding that the gun business was “pervasively regulated.” 182 The holding was limited to
situations where the regulatory inspections would further urgent federal interests and the
“possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions.” 183 The only
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limits placed on a search in such circumstances was the need for careful limitation in the time,
place, and scope of the search authority granted by statute. 184
These limited exceptions were significantly expanded in Donovan v. Dewey.185 In that
case, the warrantless inspection provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act were
challenged. 186 Rather than focusing on the history of the Fourth Amendment, the Court’s
analysis focused on Congress’ “broad authority to regulate commercial enterprises.”187
Addressing the circumstances under which a warrant may not be required, the Court stated: “A
warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that
warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory
presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property
cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for
specific purposes.”188 This new formulation departs from the need for a long history of
regulation articulated in Colonnade and the furtherance of urgent federal interests articulated in
Biswell. Instead, a reasonable Congressional determination that warrantless searches are
necessary for regulation would now be enough to convince the Court that a warrantless search is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 189
Justice Stevens writes in his dissent in Dewey that the majority’s logic appeared
“peculiar” to him because this holding makes it so that the scope of the Fourth Amendment
shrinks as governmental regulation increases. 190 The message this sends to the government is
clear: to justify a desire to search without a warrant, the government must simply increase its
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regulatory presence in an industry. Scholars like Steven Wax opine that the government has
received this message loud and clear and it has acted accordingly. 191
C. Community Caretaking
Another relevant doctrine is the Community Caretaking doctrine. The Community
Caretaking doctrine applies in situations that officers encounter daily in their “community
caretaking” function, including: “the mediation of noise disputes, the response to complaints
about stray and injured animals, and the provision of assistance to the ill or injured.” 192 In
carrying out their community caretaking function, officers are “expected to aid those in distress,
combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing, and provide an infinite
variety of services to preserve and protect public safety.” 193 Like other warrantless searches, the
Supreme Court has adopted a “reasonableness” standard. 194 This doctrine is worth exploring due
to the “community caretaking” function that SROs serve in schools.
The doctrine was first set out by the Supreme Court in 1973 in Cady v. Dombrowski.195 In
Cady, a Chicago police officer was driving drunk in Wisconsin when he got into a car
accident.196 After he was arrested and brought to the station for questioning, a Wisconsin officer
searched the car’s front seat to see if the Chicago officer’s service weapon was in there. 197 After
the car was towed, Wisconsin officers returned to search it for the service weapon once again.198
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During this search, the officers discovered a flashlight with blood on it between the front seats
and various items covered in blood in the trunk. 199 After being confronted with the items and
conferring with counsel, the Chicago officer communicated that he believed there was a body on
his brother’s farm.200 The body was found and the Chicago officer was charged with first degree
murder.201 Upon his conviction, the officer appealed contending that some of the evidence seized
from his vehicle was unconstitutionally seized.202
The Supreme Court held that the search was reasonable as a product of the police
officer’s community caretaking function rather than as a product of criminal investigation. 203
Where, as in this case, an officer reasonably believes that the trunk of an automobile contains a
gun and that trunk is vulnerable to intrusion by vandals, a search of the trunk is not unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 204 The Court justifies such a warrantless search
under the community caretaking function by acknowledging the interest in maintaining the safety
of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk
of the vehicle.205 The Supreme Court limited its holding to vehicular searches because of its own
previous recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and the home. 206
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In the years since Cady, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have been divided on
whether to extend the community caretaking doctrine to the home. 207 The Third 208 , Seventh209 ,
Ninth210 , and Tenth211 circuits have all rejected arguments to expand the doctrine to apply to
warrantless searches of the home. A minority of circuits, including the Sixth212 and Eighth213 ,
have upheld warrantless searches of homes relying on the community caretaking function. 214
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue just this year when it decided the
case Caniglia v. Strom.215 The Supreme Court unanimously declined to extend the community
caretaking doctrine to the home, reasoning that neither the holding nor logic of Cady justified
extending the community caretaking doctrine to warrantless searches and seizures in the
home.216 The Supreme Court, like the Third and Tenth circuits, noted that there is a
“constitutional difference” between the warrantless search of an impounded vehicle and the
warrantless search of the home.217
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Part IV: Supreme Court Silence
In spite of the divergence of state courts on whether searches involving SROs are to be
considered searches initiated by school officials or law enforcement 218 , the Supreme Court has
thus far declined to address this issue. The Supreme Court has also neglected to address whether
SROs are properly considered school officials or law enforcement officials. 219 Whether the
Supreme Court chooses to grant a writ of certiorari is a matter of judicial discretion. 220 Pursuant
to Rule 10 of the Supreme Court rules, a writ of certiorari will be granted for only compelling
reasons.221 The character of the reasons that the Court considers are as follows:
(a) A United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter;
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by
a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call
for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United
States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court.222
On the issue of SRO searches in schools, several of the reasons justifying granting a writ
of certiorari are present. The aforementioned state court divergence223 on how to classify
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searches involving SROs seems to be an area of pressing concern yet the Supreme Court appears
disinterested in addressing it. Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court decided an important
question of federal law when it held that SROs are properly considered school officials under the
4th Amendment of the United States Constitution in People v. Dilworth.224 The silence of the
Supreme Court in the twenty-five years since Dilworth was decided suggests that it does not take
issue with the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of SROs as school officials. This view is
further supported by the fact that the Supreme Court has since revisited school searches carried
out by school officials225 but has never heard such a case which involved an SRO. Therefore, if
the Supreme Court ever heard a case where it had to decide whether an SRO is properly
considered a school official or a law enforcement official, the Court would likely affirm the
majority view stemming from Dilworth that SROs are properly considered school officials. If the
Supreme Court were inclined to rule in any other way, it would have most likely heard a case on
this issue and done so in the decades since Dilworth.
If the Supreme Court were to defy expectations and hold that SROs are properly
considered law enforcement officials, and therefore the probable cause standard applies to
searches undertaken by SROs, the effect would be unlikely to substantially combat the school-toprison pipeline. As illustrated in Part III, there are several contexts in which the 4 th Amendment’s
protections have waned.226 An SRO who is classified as a police officer would likely still be able
to search an individual child needing only reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio227 and its
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progeny. The Supreme Court has found reasonable suspicion based upon the combination of
seemingly innocent activities228 , a partially corroborated anonymous tip229 , and even no activity
at all on the part of the individual who was stopped. 230 Further stacking the deck in favor of law
enforcement is the Court’s deference to police in determining whether reasonable suspicion
exists.231 Even if SROs were to be stripped of their classification as school officials and thus be
unable to conduct a reasonable suspicion search under T.L.O., they would still be able to conduct
individualized searches of children based on reasonable suspicion under the Terry line of cases.
Following that thread, it is likely that a variety of searches could also be justified as
administrative searches. Following Donovan v. Dewey, a warrantless administrative search is
permissible when Congress has reasonably determined that such searches are necessary to further
a regulatory scheme.232 The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994233 and the Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act of 1994234 , which prohibit the possession of guns and drugs on or near school
property235 , provide an avenue through which a warrantless administrative search would be
permissible at schools. Law enforcement would be permitted to conduct sweeping searches to
ensure that there are no drugs or guns on school property should Congress reasonably assert that
such searches are necessary to further the regulatory scheme.236 As seen in Earls237 and Acton238 ,
the Supreme Court gives great deference to a State’s interest in preventing drug use among
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children, finding this interest so great that it justifies suspicionless school drug testing programs
as reasonable.239 It is easy to imagine that the Supreme Court would be similarly inclined to give
deference to a determination that school gun and drug searches are necessary to further the
regulatory scheme by preventing drug use and gun violence in schools.
The Community Caretaking doctrine serves as another potential avenue through which
SROs could conduct searches under a reasonableness standard. 240 Thus far, the doctrine has only
been recognized by the Supreme Court in the context of vehicular searches. 241 The Court has
declined to extend the doctrine to the home due to the heightened privacy interest that exists in
the home compared to in vehicles.242 However, as demonstrated in Part II 243 , the Court views the
school as an area where privacy interests give way to the “substantial” interest of maintaining
discipline on school property.244 Given the Court’s inclination to weigh school safety245 and
discipline246 over privacy interests, it is foreseeable that the Court may extend the doctrine to
cover schools if given the opportunity.
In light of the anticipated outcomes of litigation on these issues, it appears that the 4th
Amendment is not a viable avenue for combating the school-to-prison pipeline. The Supreme
Court’s disinterest in addressing the issues surrounding SROs suggests its satisfaction with the
current state court approaches. Even if the Supreme Court were to classify SROs as law
enforcement officials, the body of law that currently exists suggests that there are various
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approaches to interpreting the 4th Amendment which would independently justify school
searches under a standard of reasonable suspicion or lower. It would be fruitless to classify SROs
as law enforcement officials because they would still be able to engage in the same behaviors
which serve to funnel children into the pipeline. Therefore, challenging the classification of
SROs is not an effective method towards solving the problem of the school-to-prison pipeline.
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